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Anna J. Schwartz
Britain's abandonment of the gold standard in 1931 signaled the end of
the gold standardera. The new technical economic insights andimprove-
ments in statistical and computational techniques that have developed in
the half century since then constitute part ofthe motivation for organiz-
ing a conference on the gold standard at this juncture-theyshould make
it possible to mine new nuggets of knowledge from the historical evi-
dence. In addition, recent experience with floating exchange rates and
unstable domestic monetary policies has made that historical evidence
seem highly relevant to today's problems. Much professional attention is
once again focused on the merits offixed exchange rates and constraints
on domestic monetary autonomy.
We date the start of the gold standard era in 1821, when Britain
resumed specie payments at the parity that had pevailed before the
NapoleonicWars, indeed, from 1717 on. By the endofthe era, 110 years
later, the gold standard had been transmuted. In the pre-World War I
period, it evolved as asystem in which countries redeemedtheirdomestic
currencies in gold and in which the offsetting of gold flows by monetary
authorities to maintain existing monetary conditions, though it occurred
from time to time, was not regarded as proper conduct. England-the
world's largest trading nation, the center of the world's commodities
markets and ofthe world's gold market, and the world's leading creditor
nation-played a central role differing from that of other countries.
Though gold was thekey reserve, manycountriesin addition heldforeign
exchange (largely though not exclusively in sterling), in itself an indica-
tion of confidence in the stability of exchange rates. By 1931, gold coins
did not circulate in most countries on the gold standard, and paper
currency could be redeemed for gold only under severe limits. Steriliza-
tion of gold flows was accepted as a desirable way to limit the internal
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monetary effects of gold flows. New York rivaled London as a second
reserve center. The resultant destabilizing shifts of foreign-exchange
reserves from the center experiencing gold losses to the other center led
to a loss of confidence in the stability ofexchange rates (Dam 1982, pp.
24-60).
The studies undertaken for this conference were designed to deepen
our understanding of the functioning of the historical gold standard. A
major by-product is to affect our response to such current economic
questions as the recent resurgence of interest in a gold standard as a
solution to problems of inflation, high interest rates, and low produc-
tivity.
Thehistory ofthe gold standard may be examinedfrom many perspec-
tives. The conference concentrated on five:
1. What were the main themes ofthe traditional literature on the gold
standard, spanning several centuries, comparedto the themes stressed in
theanalysis associatedwith thepost-WorldWarIImonetaryapproachto
the balance of payments?
2. Did operating procedures of the Bank of England before 1914
conform to theoretical notions of the ideal functioning of the gold stan-
dard?
3. What was the experience of a sample of four countries, with and
without a formal centralbank(Canada, Germany, Italy, and Sweden), in
the gold standard era? This evidence was designed to supplement more
extensive knowledge ofthe operation of the gold standard in the United
States and Great Britain.
4. What links integrated the international monetary system under the
gold standard?
5. Did the gold standard stabilize commodity prices?
The conference was enlivened by the expression of strong conflicting
views on fundamental issues. One such issue was the significance of
purchasing-power parity and interest-rate parity. Do independent
monetarypolicies have any role underfixed exchange rates ifpurchasing-
power and interest-rate parity are important? Anotherissue was the role
of central banks under the gold standard. Did these institutions, or less
formal ones that performedsimilarfunctions, impede orassist the opera-
tion ofthe gold standard, orwere theyirrelevant, so thatthe operationof
the gold standard was automatic? The pre-World War I period was
characterized by economic growth and expanding world trade. Did
adherence to fixed exchange rates under the gold standard playa major
role in producing growth or was it largely irrelevant to growth? The
importance of accounting for the links across the Atlantic under the
pre-World War I gold standard was stressed by some participants,
whereas at least one participant questioned the validity ofthe concept of3 Introduction
an Atlantic economy. The reality of trend movements in commodity
prices and long-term interest rates under the gold standard was another
subjectofdebate at theconference. Was it visual spurious regression that
producedthe appearanceoftrendsordid economicagents apprehendthe
trends as actualities? The conference did not settle these issues, but
future investigators will need to confront them in dealing with the inter-
national monetary system.
The studies that were prepared for the conference relied on various
modes of analysis. Several were based on historical nonquantitative
evidence. Some adapted the National Bureau business-cycle analysis.
Others used regression analysis. Several studies presented Granger-Sims
tests and analyses of ARIMA techniques. One general question that
arises with high-powered statisticaltests applied to pre-WorldWarI data
is the validity ofthe results, given the questionable reliability ofsome of
the underlying data. Economists may nevertheless welcome the findings
as a starting point for further refinement of hypotheses and a spur to
efforts to improve the data sets.
Section 1 of this introduction summarizes the five sessions of the
conference, highlighting unresolved issues. Contemporaries regarded
the gold standard as a qualified success yet later observers gave a less
favorable account ofthe era. Section 2attemptsto accountfor thechange
in views. The implications ofthe findings ofthe conference studies andof
Leland Yeager's suggestive talk at a dinner session form the basis for the
speculations in the concluding section 3 on the prospectsfor reinstating a
gold standard.
0.1 Summary of Issues Examined
0.1.1 The Gold Standard as Interpreted in Traditional and
Revisionist Works
Bordo surveyed six major themes developed since' the eighteenth
century in the traditional approach to the gold standard:
1. Gold represented an ideal monetary standard, both domestically
and internationally, because ofits unique qualities as a standard ofvalue
and a medium of exchange. The evils of a depreciated money under an
inconvertible fiduciary money were contrasted with the price stability
that, according to the commoditytheory ofmoney, automatic operation
of a gold standard yielded over the long run.
2. The essence of the gold standard was the maintenance of a fixed
price of a national money in terms ofgold, linking the price levels ofall
countries. The price-specie-flow mechanism ensured that any distur-
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real income and money-holding habits would lead to an equilibrating
process through arbitrage in the gold market. Gold flows, by changing a
nation's money supply, would then also change its price level.
3. The law ofone price ensured that through arbitrage and individual
trade in commodities, prices for similar goods, taking account of trans-
portation costs and trade impediments, would be similar.
4. Capital flows played a role in the gold standard balance-of-
payments adjustment mechanism, supporting the price-specie-flow
mechanism. A declineorrise in thedomesticmoneystockwouldleadto a
rise or fall in short-term interest rates affecting the movement of funds
from abroad. Long-termcapital flows were a source ofdisturbance to the
balanceofpaymentsbutalso a balancingitemin thebalanceofpayments.
By raising the price level in the capital-importing country and lowering it
in the exporting country, and hence producing a current-account surplus
in the latter and a current-account deficit in the former, the transfer of
capital resulted in a transfer of real resources.
5. The role of central banks in the adjustment mechanism was ini-
tially examined in the context of the gold standard as an automatic
monetary rule, butlaterviews shifted to the gold standardas managedby
central banks to facilitate adjustment to internal and external gold flows,
and finally to discussion of the extent to which central banks in fact
followed the rules of the game.
6. Schemes to reform the gold standard included its management by
the central bank to shield the domestic money supply from external
shocks; the separation of the medium-of-exchange function from the
standard of value, by adoption of a tabular standard, bimetallism, sym-
metallism, thecompensateddollar, ora commoditystandard; andfinally,
the creation of some form of a supernational central bank.
Harley expressed disappointment at Bordo's lack of attention to the
two issues he regarded as central to a better understanding of the gold
standard: transfers and reparations and the "Atlantic economy."
McCloskey and Zechertook issue with the traditional view that under
the gold standard, prices (interest rates) in one country could be out of
line with prices (interest rates) in the rest of the world for considerable
periods oftime, inducing first a gold flow, than a change in the country's
money supply, followed by adjustmentin its price level (interest rates) to
bring it (them) into line. In their view, prices (interest rates) interna-
tionally never diverge (except for impediments to trade and capital
movements, transportation and transactions costs) because rational eco-
nomic behavior of consumers and producers (investors) links prices
(interest rates) through arbitrage.
Lipsey criticized the McCloskey-Zecher identification of purchasing-
power parity with the law ofone price as impossible to refute and empty5 Introduction
as a theory. Using aggregate indexes of wholesale prices in different
countries to test the existence ofarbitrage, as the authors do, moreover,
was questionable given the differences in the. construction and composi-
tion ofthose series. On the other hand, if all they meant by purchasing-
powerparity was that foreign influences on prices cannotbe ignored, the
proposition was unarguable.
The evidence McCloskey and Zecher cite to support the view that
specie flows did not activate an adjustment process is that contrary to a
claim by Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 99), it did not so workin 1879.
McCloskey and Zecher assert that U.S. price movements that year
possibly anticipated gold inflows, as if arbitrage were at work, but cer-
tainly did not lag the gold inflows. Friedman's response is that the
comparisonMcCloskey andZechermake betweenprice rises and inflows
of gold is the wrong one. Gold flows are a proxy for the quantity of
money. Comparing prices and changes in the quantity ofmoney directly
fully supports the price-specie-flow mechanism. The initial gold flows, to
which McCloskey and Zecher refer, had a direct effect on the composi-
tion, rather than the rate of growth, of high-powered money.
The evidence McCloskey and Zecher cite to supporting purchasing-
power parity achieved by arbitrage is the rise in wholesale prices in the
United States after the trough in March 1933. They name the deprecia-
tion of the dollar rather than the National Recovery Act, to which
Friedman and Schwartz alluded, as the proximate cause ofthe domestic
price rise. According to them, domestic monetary growth cannot explain
movements in prices beyond what are explained by purchasing-power
parity.
With respect to the rise in wholesale prices after the trough in March
1933, Friedman denies that the discussion in A Monetary History was an
attempt to assess the relative contribution of several sources of price
enhancement. The depreciation ofthe dollar, the growth in the domestic
money stock, and New Deal measures, including the Agricultural
Adjustment Act, the Guffey Coal Act, and still others that affected
wages and prices, all played their part.
Yeager's conclusion that acceptance ofthe general validity ofpurchas-
ing-power parity and interest-rate parity need not exclude the general
validity ofthe quantity theoryofmoneyfor the analysis ofdomesticprice
movements is a judicious statement. Under a gold standard, centrifugal
forces had some play, but ultimately centripetal forces triumphed.
Themonetary approachto the balance ofpaymentsasserts thatthereis
one world, not a collection of separate national entities. One can easily
accommodate a one-world view with degrees of autonomy over limited
periodsfor individualeconomies. Underfixed exchange rates, depending
on the degree of autonomy, individual economies could exercise control6 Anna J. Schwartz
over their prices and interest rates in order to extend the period for
adjustment, shortofcutting loose from the restraintsimposed by thegold
standard.
Mundell pointed out that the difference between these two views was
reminiscent of an earlier discussion in 1937 between D. H. Robertson
and Jacob Viner on the international adjustment mechanism. Abramo-
vitz expressed concern that findings reported in the long-swing literature
had not been integrated into the discussion of the gold standard.
In early writings on the gold standard, gold flows served as the princi-
pal adjustment mechanism. Subsequently, as Bordo, Dornbusch and
Frenkel, and Rich note, the role ofshort-term capital flows in the adjust-
ment mechanism came to be recognized. The expansion of possible
modesofadjustmentto disequilibriumin acountry'sbalanceofpayments
due to domestic or external shocks does not damage the validity of the
specie-flow mechanism. It simply indicates that adjustment became
possible with a broader range of technical means.
In sum, the issue ofwhether the dominant adjustment mechanism that
links economies under fixed exchange rates is purchasing-power parity
and interest-rate parity or specie flows was not resolved at the confer-
ence.
0.1.2 Technical Procedures: Rules of the Game
The papers by Duttonand Pippengergive conflicting interpretationsof
theevidence onthe BankofEngland'spre-1914performance. According
to Dutton, theBankmay have violated two versions ofthe so-called rules
of the game: one, the traditional view, requiring central banks to rein-
force or not counteract the effects of gold flows on domestic money
supplies; the other, a view propounded by Michaely (1971), requiring
central banks to refrain from countercyclical operations, limiting their
objective to maintenance of convertibility. According to Pippenger, on
the other hand, the Bank was sensitive to threats to convertibility posed
by international capital flows or by increases in domestic income and did
not accommodate changes in the level of domestic incomes.
Moggridge notedthatDutton'spaperdoes notdetermine how muchof
the offsetting by the Bank of England, in violation of the no-offsetting
rule, was "an automatic reflection of the discount market being forced
into the Bank and how much reflected deliberate policy" (p. 197) and
whether the Bankbecame more inclined to violate some rules overtime.
Goodhart agreed that the Bank's open-market operations imparted a
procyclical impulse to the monetary base, but attributed it not to profit
motives, as Pippenger does, nor to the "needsoftrade," as Dutton does,
but ratherto theBank'sconcernto protectits shareofthe Londonmoney
market that was threatened by the growth of the London clearing banks
in the 1890s.7 Introduction
The tests of the rules may not have captured the effects ofshort-term
and long-term capital transactions and hence may have provided an
inadequate basis for judgments of the operation of the system. An
interest-rate variable in a regression will not necessarily reflect the im-
petusfor capitalflows. IfBrinleyThomas (1973) is correct, Britishcapital
exportsandAmericancapitalimportswerelinkedmorecloselyto domes-
tic- and foreign-investment activity than to interest rates (Bordo's paper
in this volume, app. E). Transfers on private capital account must have
had a disturbing influence on the lending country ofgreater significance
than the financing of existing commodity trade. In the London money
market, in addition, issues of foreign governments created balances for
the debtor that required monetary management by the Bank ofEngland
to counteract gold movements induced by international capital transac-
tions. The importance of those transactions is indicated by the fact that
before 1914, Britain invested abroad at an annual rate of4 percent ofits
nationalincome and about30 percentofits annualsavings. Workingwith
a small gold reserve, the Bank of England nevertheless avoided catas-
trophe in the wake ofBritain's huge capital exports and general interna-
tional interests. How did it achieve that result?
Onesuggestion is thata strategicelementwas involved-allthe players
were aware ofthe consequence ofcollectively seeking to convert sterling
into gold. Perhaps the public-good aspect ofthe pre-World War I man-
aged gold standard was more important than under the Bretton Woods
system.
Another possibility is that the Bank of England resorted to some
devices that do not appear in regressions testing its performance (on the
devices, see Sayers 1936; Bloomfield 1963):
1. The use of variations in the price of gold is well known. The Bank
acted on the gold points by varying its price for bars and foreign coins,
refusing to sell bars or giving free advances on gold imports. Bank rate
did not invariably move in line with the use of gold devices.
2. Open-market operations were conducted in such a way as to shield
the domestic economy to the extent possible from actions designed to
accommodate international capital movements. What seems to be a
violation ofthe rules may in fact be the adaptation ofpolicy to Britain's
international role.
3. To discourage certain loans, typically originating in foreign transac-
tions, the Bank manipulated the rate on advances or rediscounting,
setting a higher rate than the official one.
4. England held vast short-term claims on foreign debtors that re-
spondedto Bankmoves. Theresponsiveness ofshort-termcapital tended
to equalize open-market rates in different gold standard countries.
5. Byextendingorrestricting short-terminternationalloans, theBank
of England exercised a degree of control over the distribution of newly
mined gold.8 Anna J. Schwartz
Accordingly, when the Bank of England intervened in the money
market, it may not have been violating the rules of the game.
Dornbusch and Frenkel provide another view of the nineteenth-
century gold standard in their study of the operation of the Bank in a
singleyear, 1847,whentwocrisesoccurredin thespring andthefall-one
due to an external drain, the otherto both aninternal and externaldrain.
They criticize the Bank's performance in both crises and emphasize the
role of international capital flows during the adjustment process. For
Dornbusch and Frenkel, suspension of the Act of 1844 limiting the
Bank's fiduciary issue was required for the restoration ofconfidence but
represented collapse of the rigid gold standard rules. Hence, for them,
thegold standardprovideda stablefinancial frameworkfacilitating finan-
cial intermediation only when there was a lender-of-Iast-resort willing to
discount freely during crises.
Hughes commented that the Dornbusch-Frenkel focus on the mone-
taryliabilities ofthe BankofEnglandignoredhighly volatile movements
ofthe domesticmoneysupplyheldbythepublicthatwas a multipleofthe
Bank's note issues. The financial crisis in his view originated in the
financial system outside the Bank, and it was the "cascading deluge upon
the banksanddiscounthouses" oftheprivateissues "thatmade theBank
Act of 1844 an iron lid that had to be removed by the Treasury letter"
(p. 266).
0.1.3 InternationalExperiencein the Operationofthe Gold
Standard
The papers on the experience of a sample offour countries under the
gold standard tend to dismiss the importance of monetary actions in
accord with the theoretically appropriate "rules of the game" as the
explanation for the operationofthe fixed-exchange-rate system. Neither
Sweden nor Germany before 1914 apparently observed the rules of the
game, according to lonung and McGouldrick. Fratianni and Spinelli
report that Italy did not even formally adhere to a gold standardfor most
ofthe period 1861-1914. In Shearer and Clark's account, Canada, with-
out a central bank, fortuitously returnedtothe goldstandardafterWorld
War I and shortly thereafter abandoned it.
The foregoing papers provide evidence that supplements the volumi-
nousliteratureonGreatBritainandtheUnitedStates(forexample, Ford
1962 on the asymmetry of gold standard experience as between Great
Britain and the peripheral countries to which it exported capital;
Morgenstern 1959 on interactions among the money markets in Great
Britain, Germany, France, andthe UnitedStates; andotherstudies cited
in Bordo, app. E).
Freedman noted that Shearer and Clark do not provide a general-
equilibrium framework for their analysis of Canadian monetary history9 Introduction
between the wars, but direct attention to such elements as "the rela-
tionship between the price ofgold and the relative costs of borrowing in
New Yorkand borrowingunderthe Finance Act, the use ofgold devices,
and the response by the authorities to the gold flows at the end of the
1920s and in the early 1930s" (p. 307).
Fleisig also objected to the absence of a model of international eco-
nomic interaction underlying McGouldrick's and other papers at the
conference. In his view McGouldrick does not explain Germany's gold
standard experience in light of current models of the international
economy that dismiss both specie flow and monetary theory of the
balance of payments as inappropriate.
Lindert expressed doubt that Sweden's successful performance was
related to the gold standard, arguing that economic growth there was
attributable to the high level of human capital and abundant natural
resources that would have attracted capital inflows also under flexible
exchange rates. Accordingly, he suggested that Sweden remained onthe
gold standard because the country grew rapidly, not vice versa.
Syllafound unacceptablethe implication thatmoneywas a luxurygood
in Italy-a conclusion Fratianni and Spinelli reach from the money-
demandfunction theyestimate. Hewas also skepticalthat "countryrisk"
was the explanation for deviations from purchasing-power parity that
the authors calculate. Instead, he suggested that Italian prices in fact
were world prices, adjusted to take account of falling international-
transactions costs.
How does one reconcile the finding that the gold standard as a fixed-
exchange-rate system performed well, although country after country
seems not to have observed the rules required to remain on the gold
standard? Onepossibility is that central banksviolated the rules only to a
limited extent. It is clear that cumulated deficits and surpluses in balance
ofpaymentsoccurredonlywhencapitalflows sustainedthem. The system
did not break down as a result of such flows.
Brunner suggested in discussion from the floor that in the context of
well-established expectations that the gold standard would be main-
tained, whether required adjustment occurred primarily in the shares of
traded and nontraded goods, in long- or short-term capital movements,
orin substantial changes in relatives prices depended on the character of
the shocks affecting individual economies-nominalorreal, transitoryor
permanent.
Itis easy for present-dayobservers to assume that central banks before
1914 were guided by macrostabilization goals, as in the post-World War
II setting, but there is no firm basis for such an assumption. Whether
formal central banks existed, as in Europe, or commercial banks or the
Treasury exercised central-bank functions, their behavior was successful
in maintaining the standard. Was it all waste motion, because the rules of10 Anna J. Schwartz
the game were unimportant, as the monetary-approach-to-the-balance-
of-payments theorists insist? This issue the conference did not settle.
Clearly, discretionary actions were taken. Whether they served to speed
adjustment was again left an open question.
0.1.4 International Linkages under the Gold Standard
Thepapersonlinkages undertheinternationalgold standardapproach
the question from a number of perspectives. Huffman and Lothian
examine interrelations between the United States and the United King-
dom for the century from 1833 to 1932. They conclude from a historical
analysis that cyclical fluctuations were transmitted from one country to
the other either by gold movements or by panic-induced changes in the
money multiplier. From a battery of Granger-Sims autoregressive tests,
they conclude that real income in both countries was influenced by both
domestic and other-country variables. In addition, they point to weak
links between U.S. and U.K. price-level movements as evidence against
the monetary approach to the balance of payments.
Connolly, in commenting on the paper, found the evidence against the
monetary approach questionable since the Granger-Sims tests the au-
thors rely onomit contemporaneousvariables that might reveal effective
price arbitrage.
Easton, on the other hand, using data for eight countries for 1879-
1914, finds no evidence in bivariate relations that either real or nominal
income in one country provided any information on those variables in
another. GeoffreyWoodarguedthatEaston'sfinding confoundsdemand
and supply shocks under a fixed-exchange-rate system. Demand shocks
produce positive correlations, supply shocks, negative correlations be-
tween income movements across countries. By examining the periodas a
whole, rather than individual episodes, Easton's approach ensures that
such relationships as existedwould not befound. AsWoodpointedout, a
predictable monetary system imposes no particular systematic behavior
pattern on the real economy. Thomas was troubled by the failure to test
properlyfor theAtlantic-economy relationships thathehadinvestigated,
not only in Easton's work but also in several other papers that had been
presented.
Meltzer's point in discussion from the floor bore on the importance of
the institutional framework under the gold standard that the papers
seemed to neglect. Not only was there a predictable monetary system,
butdecisions in all marketscould be madewithfirm expectationsthat, for
example, price controls or other arbitrary measures would not be im-
posed.
Richfinds thattheprice-specie-flow mechanism operatedoverthe long
run but not over the short run in pre-World War I Canada, concluding
that the failure ofthe mechanism in the short run was an important cause11 Introduction
of cyclical instability under the gold standard. Thus a balance-of-
payments deficit that led to a gold outflow, a decline in the monetary
base, and a rise in interest rates would induce banks to reduce their
reserve ratios and expand the money supply, impeding cyclical adjust-
ment. As evidence, Rich cites lack ofcorrespondence between Canadian
and U.S. interest rates and the lower variance of Canadian-relative-to-
U.S. interest rates.
Temin asked why U.S. and Canadian interest rates did not move
together, as one would expect if asset markets were unified. Possible
explanations that he offered were data problems or noncompetitive
behavior by Canadian banks.
The studies of international linkages only scratch the surface of the
subject. Examination of effects of transmission on national product
accounts unavoidably involves the use of questionable data. Annual
interpolations of benchmark figures, on which most pre-World War I
nominal- and real-income data are based, raise doubts about the reliabil-
ity of the estimates and the statistical significance of tests utilizing those
data.
Apart from the reliability of the data, we still need to learn how
transmission occurred. Thestudies do not provide a systematicinvestiga-
tion ofthe role oftransmission instruments. The instruments could have
been gold flows, commodity-trade flows, capital flows, interest rates, or
monetary flows. Did transmission occur through nominal linkages? Ifso,
how was the division of nominal changes between prices. and output
determined in the country thatwas the recipient ofthe transmission? Did
the division vary from country to country, orwere there trend influences
that operated jointly on all gold standard countries, such as the secular
price movements from the mid-1870s to 1896 and from 1897 to 1913?
0.1.5 The Stability of Price-Level Trends under the
Gold Standard
Plots of wholesale prices before 1914 seem to be characterized by
well-defined, alternately declining and rising trends. The traditional ex-
planation has focused on the commodity theory of money. A decline in
the trend of the price level reflected a more rapid growth of world real
output andhence in the demandfor monetarygold thanthe growthin the
world's monetary gold stock could accommodate. The movement in the
price level induced a shift from nonmonetary to monetary uses of gold
and ultimately led to increased gold production. A rise in the trendofthe
price level reflected more rapid growth in the world's monetary gold
stock than in the demand for monetary gold, inducing a shift from
monetary to nonmonetary uses ofgold and ultimately to decreased gold
production.
The widely accepted view of persistent trends in the price level under12 Anna J. Schwartz
the gold standard was subjected to strong attack by Benjamin and
Kochin, who argue that U.K. prices display the characteristics of a
random walk once systematic movements are eliminated by the ARIMA
technique. Similarly, the yield on consols after elimination ofsystematic
movements is essentially a random walk. They dismiss Irving Fisher's
finding that a distributed lag on past inflation rates was positively corre-
latedwith currentinterestrates, since sucha methodofforecasting would
be rational only ifinflation rates were positively correlatedserially. They
report that such was not the case and conclude that the effects of war
expenditures explain comovements of the price level and interest rates.
Oncetheinfluence ofwars is accountedfor, virtuallynoevidence remains
of a linkage between the change in the price level and the change in
long-~erm interest rates.
Cagan's comments on the paper provide grounds for skepticism with
regard to the authors' conclusions. Under a gold standard, prices were
not in fact completely stable from year to year, despite the assurance of
long-run price stability that a commodity standard is said to provide.
Contemporaries might not immediately have recognized that a shift of
thetrendin prices, say, from falling to rising, hadoccurred. Such recogni-
tion would gradually develop, even though year-to-year changes would
be regarded by them as random. Corresponding movements in bond
yields would not then be accidental but a gradual response to price
trends.
Rockoffexaminestheresponseofgoldproductiontomovementsin the
relative price of gold before 1933. Gold output responded to market
incentives in line with the commodity theory of money, which posits an
inverse relationship between the general price level and the opportunity
cost of producing gold. The incentives affected the timing of gold dis-
coveries and advances in mining techniques, and influenced the willing-
ness of producers to adopt existing capital-intensive methods of pro-
duction. Imposition or relaxation of governmental environmental
regulations could thwart or support market incentives. Rockoff also
compares the means and standard deviations of annual growth rates of
the world's monetarygold stock from 1839 to 1929 with those ofthe U.S.
monetary base from 1949 to 1979. The gold standard regime gives more
stable results.
As Barro notes in his comments, the monetary-gold-stock results do
not carryover to broader monetary aggregates and the price level, in a
comparison with the post-World War II regime. However, the more
favorable resultsfor thepost-WorldWarIIperiodmayreflect alterations
in banking institutions rather than a 'shift from the gold standard. Had
these alterations been implemented during the gold standard era, the
year-to-year stability of broader aggregates and prices might have sur-
passed the results for the post-World War II era.13 Introduction
An existing (Bordo 1981) study compares real-output stability under
the gold standard in the United States and Great Britain with the corre-
sponding measure under the managed currency systems that superseded
the gold standard. A desirable addition to the conference would have
been similar studies for other countries.
0.2 Changing Professional Assessments of the Gold Standard
Looking back over world experience with monetary systems in the
nineteenth century and its sequel in the twentieth century, one is struck
by fluctuations in the esteem with which economists have regarded a
metallic standard. After the widely known examples of paper-money
inflation that occurred in the closing decades of the eighteenth century
and the first decade of the nineteenth century (in the U.S. colonies, in
France during the Revolution, andin Britain during theNapoleonicera),
thesuperiorityofa metallicstandardseemedself-evidentin theoryandin
practice. In both established and newly created nation-states in the
nineteenthcentury, theevolutionofmonetarysystemsusually proceeded
with the displacement of silver as the monometallic standard or the
consort of gold in a bimetallic standard. The norm evolved as free and
unlimited coinage of gold with subsidiary coins of silver, nickel, and
bronze orcopper, and government fiduciary issues and bank notes freely
convertible into gold. In less-developed countries, convertibility was
provided by foreign-exchange reserves linked to gold. A paperstandard,
by contrast, came to represent fiscal imprudence and economic back-
wardness.
Even before the end ofthe nineteenth century, however, popular and
professional criticism of the gold standard arose. What occasioned the
criticism was the secular price rise associated with the midcentury gold
discoveries and the long, secular price decline that got under way in the
1870s underanexpandinginternationalgoldstandard. Thefirst challenge
to the virtue ofthe gold standardwas thatit did not assure price stability.
In his pamphlet, "A Serious Fall in the Value ofGold Ascertained, and
Its Social Effects Set Forth" ([1863] 1884), William Stanley Jevons esti-
mated that between 1848 and 1860 the value ofgold hadfallen 9 percent.
In1875 hequestionedtheuse ofmetallicstandardsofvalue, inviewofthe
extreme changes in theirvalues, and urged as a reform a tabularstandard
ofvalue ([1875] 1884). AlfredMarshall ([1887] 1925) discussed "theevils
of a fluctuating standard of value" (p. 189), and concluded that "the
precious metals cannot afford a good standard of value" (p. 192). He
dismissed bimetallism as flawed and proposed as a remedy for the
fluctuating standard ofvalue either symmetallism or a tabular standard.
With the reversal of the secular price movement after 1896, concern14 Anna J. Schwartz
shifted to the inflationary,fluctuation of the standard. The remedy that
Irving Fisher (1913) proposed was the compensated dollar.
Thegold standardceasedtofunction internationallyduringWorld War
I, and the question ofits merits or demerits was temporarily set aside. In
the aftermath, inflation in the victorious countries and hyperinflation in
the vanquished, as governments financed wartime and postwar expendi-
tures by depreciating their currencies, again revived the attraction ofthe
gold standard. Widely reintroduced in the years 1925 to 1929 (although
attenuated by the cessation ofgold-coin circulation and the limitation of
convertibility to bullion bars or sales of foreign exchange), the gold
standard collapsed shortly thereafter, destroyed by the economic holo-
caust of 1929-33.
This time the main professional attack was directed to fixed exchange
rates through which the gold standard works, although attention also
focused onspecific problemsthatwere identified as hamperingthe opera-
tion ofthe post-World War I gold standard (the maldistribution ofgold,
the inadequacy of world gold output, and the poorly aligned exchange-
rate structure that had beenrestored). Fixed exchange rates required the
internal economy to adjust to the balance ofpayments. Only by cutting
loose from the gold standard were countries able to escape the deflation-
ary pressure imposed on them by the fixed-exchange-rate system. Inter-
nal adjustmentto declining world prices was no longeracceptable domes-
tic economic policy, and growing rigidity of prices and costs allegedly
placed an intolerable burden ofadjustment on the economy. Moreover,
far from correcting externally arising disturbances, the gold standard
fostered them by transmitting maladjustments from one country to
another.
Anadditional problemunderthe gold standard, accordingto its critics,
was that capital movements, short-term ones in particular, did not pro-
vide a corrective mechanism butinstead aggravated the underlying situa-
tion that generated the capital flows (see Bordo, appendix E, this
volume). The flows, in effect, were uncontrollable. Raising the discount
ratehadnotstoppedcapitalflight buthadintensifiedit; the rising ratewas
interpreted as a signal that further flight would lead to devaluation. At
the same time, the discount-rate rise had served to heighten deflationary
pressures on the domestic economy. On the other hand, a discount-rate
rise thatwas expectedto curb internalexpansion instead attractedcapital
from abroad and promoted further expansion. Capital movements,
under fixed exchange rates, induced by interest-rate changes, operated
primarily on reserves and foreign exchange of the central bank but did
not immediately induce changes in the current account. Fundamental
adjustment, moreover, was deterred when long-term capital exports
were offset by short-term capital imports. Alternatively, when long-term
capital exports ceased, the capital-importing countries confronted fixed-15 Introduction
interest charges with deflationary impact on their economies, with reflex
influence on the capital-exporting, interest-receivingcountries. The gold
standard thus was charged with having contributed to the instability of
the world economic system after 1929.
Professional approbationofa paperstandard that gained groundin the
1930s was tempered by the belief that unrestrained, it would encourage
beggar-thy-neighborpolicies. The Bretton Woods arrangements embod-
ied the interpretation of the views and experience ofthe 1930s-pegged
exchange rates were essential to prevent chaos in international financial
and trade transactions, but national economies should be free to restrict
capital flows and to resort to the expedient ofdevaluation in order to be
relieved of the necessity to deflate when in current-account deficit. The
objectionable feature of pegged rates in forcing governments to imple-
ment monetary changes that conflicted with the goals offull employment
orprice stabilitywould beremovedwhile preserving thedesirablefeature
of providing stable conditions in foreign exchange to promote interna-
tional trade.
Convertibility of many European currencies was first achieved under
theBrettonWoodssystemin 1958. Foronly a few years thereaftercanthe
system be said to have functioned fairly effectively. From the mid-1960s
on, it was characterized by repeated foreign-exchange crises as market
participants anticipated that existing par values were unsustainable and
shiftedfunds from a weakcurrencyto a strongcurrency, exacerbatingthe
external position for both currencies.
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods arrangements, efforts to
rehabilitate the gold standard have proceeded along two lines. One,
inspired by the professional development of the monetary approach to
the balance ofpayments, argues in favor offixed exchange rates as a way
to attain the benefits of risk-pooling and the integration of commodity
andfactor marketsonaworldwide basis. The otherline is drawnfrom the
collapse ofthe Bretton Woods arrangements. The lesson, on this view, is
notthatonlya floating-rate systemcan accommodateinflationarypolicies
in the reserve-center country and conflicting policies in the nonreserve
countries. Rather, the lesson is that the floating-rate system has permit-
ted enormous growth ofinconvertible paper-money issues that produced
unprecedented peacetime inflation rates and extraordinary levels of in-
terest rates. Consequently, it is argued, it is essential to establish a stable
international money based on gold.
The advocates offer varying prescriptions. One would rely on the
changing market price ofgold as an indicator to the monetary authorities
ofthe appropriaterate ofincrease ordecrease in the growth ofthemoney
supply, with no commitment on their part to buy orsell gold orto peg its
price. Although the price ofgold would thus playa part in the monetary
system, it would lack crucial elements of gold standards known in the16 Anna J. Schwartz
past. Another prescription includes stabilizing the dollar price of gold,
issuance ofgold coins with a face value equalto the stabilizedgoldparity,
restoration of convertibility by linking change in money bases-in the
United States to gold purchases and sales in a private gold market, andin
non-reserve-center countries to changes in their holdings of gold and
foreign exchange-and, finally, multilateral surveillance ofcountry bal-
ance-of-payments problems. A more radical prescription would elimi-
nate government-issued money. The government's role would be limited
to defining a monetary unit as a specific weight of gold. Private issuers
would then be free to issue claims denominated in the officially defined
unit.
This sectionsuggeststhatsupportfor a resurrectedmetallicstandardof
whatever form would in time dissolve, as it has for all earlier standards.
What the odds are for success in the restoration of a role for gold is the
subject of the concluding section.
0.3 Prospects for Reinstating the Gold Standard
Theconferencestudies deal with historicalevidence-obviouslyneces-
sary to our understanding of the gold standard as it once existed. That
evidence also directs our attention to the possibility that the factors that
permitted the gold standard to flourish are now obsolete. What were
those factors? Can we now re-create them?
We can distinguish at least seven objective factors that promoted the
existence of an international metallic standard:
1. the essentially fixed price of gold over the century the conference
studies covered
2. a link between domestic money supply and the gold reserve
3. relative stability in conditions of gold production
4. equilibrium in mint pars among gold standard countries
5. coordination ofeconomic policies among countries adhering to the
standard
6. limited role of government in economic and social affairs
7. relative absence ofpolitical upheavals exemplified by war and rev-
olution and the role ofLondon as the hub ofthe international monetary
system
These objective factors were stabilizing forces that made the gold stan-
dard a stable standard of value. Whether the stability was an inherent
feature of the gold standard or simply the consequence of underlying
stability of other institutions is the issue.
In addition to the objective factors, mention must also be made ofthe
weight of the psychological belief in the unquestioned and unquestion-
able obligation to adhere to the gold standard and to the specific fixed
price ofgold. Flouting the gold standard risked the opprobrium ofone's17 Introduction
own countrymen and of the rest of the world. Political leaders did not
regardthe goldstandardas apolicyinstrumentsubjectto manipulationin
the pursuit ofother goals. The hold ofthe gold standard as the guarantor
of the domestic value of a currency and of stable international financial
dealings was sacrosanct.
Can we count on the stability ofthe objective factors in contemporary
economic circumstances?
0.3.1 The Price of Gold
A fundamental problem confronting the reinstatement of the gold
standard is the choice of the dollar price at which to resume. The very
conception oftrying to determine the correct price somehowviolates the
mystiqueofthestandard. Theprice thenbecomes apolitical decision, the
opposite of the freedom of the standard from political influence that
untlerlay its mystique. For the purpose of this analysis, assume the
following solution: let the inflation rate of the general price level be
reducedtozero; thepriceofgold at thattime would bethecorrectprice at
which to resume.
Once a price for gold is determined, the principal central banks, it has
been suggested, should proceed to peg it. To preventthe gold price from
rising, sales of gold from existing stocks could be used. To support the
price, countries could use their own currencies-with possible inflation-
ary consequences. Assuming the price were "correct," the pegging op-
erationmight be successful. Arranging the responsibility for intervention
in the gold market could be managed along the lines ofthe Gold Pool of
1961, provided exchange rates did not vary. If they did, since an ex-
change-ratechangeis a gold-pricechange in atleastonecountry, specula-
tion in gold markets would be encouraged. The pegging operation would
then become more troublesome.
0.3.2 Linking the Domestic Money Supply and Gold Reserves
A pegged price ofgold is not a sufficient condition for a reinstatement
ofthe gold standard. Some link between the domestic money supply and
a country's gold reserves is essential. Would it be feasible to restore
convertibility ofpaper currency into gold for domestic and foreign hold-
ers? Countries would be required to yield the discretion they currently
exercise in determiningthelevel andgrowth rate oftheirdomesticmoney
supplies and to accept the effects on money supply that changing gold
reserves would dictate. Would they be willing to accept so severe a
restriction on their internal monetary policies?
0.3.3 Stability of Gold Output
Ifa correct price ofgold were achieved for resumption, the stability of
theprice level underthegold standardthenceforthwould thendependon18 Anna J. Schwartz
the adequacy of gold output to provide for monetary and nonmonetary
demands for gold. An adequate supply of gold is essential for adequate
monetary growth. The forecasts of gold output over the rest of the
century in the market economies with known gold reserves are not
optimistic. Whether the forecasts might be belied by discovery of new
mines ormining processes andwhether the inadequacyofthe flow supply
might be offset by changing patterns of industrial demand for gold or
shiftsfrom investmentstocksstillleaves the reinstatementofthe standard
as a measure that risks imposing long-run deflation onthe economy. The
fact that the bulk of current world gold output is produced by South
Africa and the Soviet Union adds an element of possible instability in
future gold output for political reasons.
Rockoffsuggests another difference between the past and the putative
future performance of the gold standard related to the gold-mining
industry, namely, thatthepublicis unlikelyto toleratelong and uncertain
lags in the responseofthe goldsupplytothechangingdemandfor money.
This difference possibly could be classified as psychological, but, if accu-
rate, it clearly impinges on an objective factor.
0.3.4 Fixing Multilateral Exchange Rates
Once a correct fixed price of gold were chosen, each gold standard
country would adopt par rates of exchange for its currency relative to
other currencies. As Yeager remarks, the mint pars under the classical
gold standard expressed an equilibrium that had gradually evolved
among national price levels. This time, par rates of exchange would be
arbitrarily chosen. The mistakes in choice ofexchange rates when Euro-
'pean countries resumed in the decade of the 1920s and again under the
Bretton Woods arrangements are not reassuring.
0.3.5 Coordination of-National Economic Policies
The gold standard can survive in a world in which countries allow gold
to move freely; gold does not accumulate in any country and gold does
not drain away from any country without being allowed to exercise an
expansionaryorcontractionaryeffect, respectively, onthelevelofprices;
and major disequilibria in price levels and financial conditions among
countries are not endured. The forces that caused the breakdown ofthe
Bretton Woods system were unleashed by actions of countries with a
persistent deficit or surplus in their balances ofpayments. Those actions
were taken to delay or resist changes in prices and costs expressed in
national currencies. Underfixed exchange rates, convergence ofnational
economic policies is essential for the system to be viable. The European
Monetary System presupposes such behavior. Yet since 1979 when the
system was established, member countries have repeatedly preferred to
alter the relation between national price and cost levels by exchange-rate19 Introduction
changes. This is not a goodauguryfor restorationofaninternationalgold
standard.
0.3.6 Role of Government
Under the classical gold standard, governments in peacetime did not
undertake expendituresthatwere financed by the printingpress. In some
gold standardcountries, government was not divorced from business and
social insurance was accepted policy. Basically, however, government
participation in economic activity was restrained by concern to preserve
the integrity of the national currency and to maintain its domestic and
external value. These concerns receded after 1929 as governments ex-
tended their. activities to finance stabilization policies in response to
interest groups wielding political influence. The question then arises
whether in the future governments will reverse theircourse, returning to
a more limited role, as in the pre-World War I era. Ofcourse, a limited
role of the state is not in itself a guarantee of a viable international
monetarysystem, sinceinearliererasinternationalmonetaryaffairs were
often in disarray, even with limited states (Dam 1982, p. 38).
0.3.7 Civil and International Peace and London's Predominance
The gold standard collapsed when countries were engulfed by war or
revolution. The relative political stability of the pre-1914 era therefore
contributed to the maintenance of the standard. The significance of this
factor is underscored by the prewar examples of capital flows that were
steered by governments for national political and strategic reasons.
French investors responded to official regulation and pressure by buying
Russian governmentloansfor railroadconstruction-ofmilitaryvalue, in
the eyes ofboth governments. Germany's foreign investments also were
directed to achieve national-security goals. The ensuing war destroyed
not only the gold standard but also the investments.
The gold standard flourished before World War I possibly because of
the special position ofsterling and London. Thatpositionwas threatened
even before the war when Paris and Berlin became important rivals of
London. Thereafter, London's predominance was never reestablished.
Under the Bretton Woods system, the special position was that of the
dollar and the UnitedStates. Asthepositionofthe U.S. dollarcrumbled,
thesystem collapsed. Is animportantaspectofthesuccessful operationof
a gold-centered monetary system an unshakable confidence that a domi-
nant reserve-currency would always be converted into gold on demand?
Which currency would be the candidate for such a role in a future gold
standard?
This brief survey suggests that the objective factors that served to
promote the international gold standard in the past are no longer favor-
able to such an institution. And, as noted, the psychological factor of20 Anna J. Schwartz
reverence for the standard has all but vanished except among a minority
offaithful believers. Like Miniver Cheevy, they probably were born too
late.
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